

Socio-economic Models in Europe and Latin America. A Typology of Inequality and Instability

Modelos socioeconómicos en Europa y América Latina: una tipología de la desigualdad e inestabilidad

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Key words

Social Coverage

- Conservatism
- Inequality
- Distribution
- Informality
- Institutions
- Liberalism
- Power Resources

Palabras clave

Cobertura social

- Conservadurismo
- Desigualdad
- Distribución
- Informalidad
- Instituciones
- Liberalismo
- Recursos de poder

Abstract

This article compares employment models and welfare regimes in Europe and Latin America between 2008 and 2023. We underline three key points: First, distribution institutions and the ideal of egalitarian democracy have receded in all welfare regimes. Income inequalities stagnated or increased in Europe, while they fell in some Latin American countries. Second, the loss of union power resources correlates with the weakening of distributive institutions. Coordinated Economies models have sustained distribution better than Liberal Market Economies. Third, the main discriminating factors are occupational institutionalization versus informality, further away the rates of occupational activity and the coverage of collective bargaining. In social institutions, five types are distinguished: high, medium-high, medium-low, low and very low.

Resumen

Este artículo compara los modelos de empleo y regímenes de bienestar en Europa y Latinoamérica entre 2008 y 2023. Subrayamos tres puntos claves: primero, las instituciones de distribución y el ideal de democracia igualitaria han retrocedido en todos los regímenes de bienestar. Las desigualdades en los ingresos se estancaron o aumentaron en Europa, mientras que en algunos países de América Latina se redujeron; segundo, la pérdida de recursos de poder sindical correlaciona con el debilitamiento de las instituciones distributivas, los modelos de economías coordinadas han sostenido mejor la distribución que las economías liberales de mercado; y, tercero, los principales factores discriminantes son la institucionalidad social-laboral versus informalidad, a más distancia las tasas de actividad ocupacional y la cobertura de la negociación colectiva. En la institucionalidad social se distinguen cinco tipos: alta, media-alta, media-baja, baja y muy baja.

Citation

Martín Artiles, Antonio (2026). "Socio-economic Models in Europe and Latin America. A Typology of Inequality and Instability". *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 193: 89-112. (doi: 10.5477/cis/reis.193.89-112)

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INTRODUCTION¹

This work is relevant given the inequalities in economic income which have tended to stagnate or even increase over recent years, following the financial crisis (2008-2015) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022). These crises have profoundly affected employment and redistributive institutions. Redistributive institutions such as those of health care, education, housing, pensions, and benefits have suffered from cutbacks in social spending as a result of the decline in gross domestic product in many countries. Economic policy responses have been different in both crises.

Between 2008 and 2023, two opposing economic policy orientations have been observed (Crouch, 2022; Pelke, 2023). On the one hand, during the years of the financial crisis, European governments encouraged neoliberal austerity policies, making cuts in public spending, reductions in the purchasing power of wages and freezing the creation of public employment. During this period, the priority was to reduce the deficit and public debt as much as possible. On the other hand, during the crisis caused by the pandemic, state intervention policies were undertaken in an attempt to maintain employment and public health. This highlighted the importance of collective goods and the tripartite social pact as a form of institutional mediation and economic governance (Eurofound, 2024). In other words, neo-corporatist practices were promoted (Meardi and Tassinari, 2022).

In short, both of these crises affected primary income, derived from the labor market, as well as post-distributive in-

come, coming from cuts in welfare regimes. This article analyzes the interaction between pre-distributive and post-distributive institutions. A conceptual framework is provided to compare the employment models and welfare regimes of Latin America and Europe, examining how certain types of pre-distributive institutions generate primary inequalities in economic income and how other institutional arrangements foster post-distributive policies to mitigate these inequalities. This is a reference to an aspect of the varieties of capitalism and the types of socioeconomic institutions (Scharpf, 1992; Crouch, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Menz 2008; Bosch *et al.*, 2009; Zalakain and Barragué, 2017).

Typologies and models have been criticized for their rigidity and inability to adapt to structural changes. In this work, we consider the institutional transformations arising from the financial crisis and the pandemic. We examine how they have affected social stakeholders, political stability, the management of wage coordination, and income inequalities.

This article has two main objectives: 1) To examine how income inequalities have changed between 2008 and 2023; 2) To identify the variables influencing the configuration of employment and welfare models.

It is assumed that this crisis context has modified distributive institutions. We show that changes in redistributive institutions and inequalities correlate with factors such as a declining Gross Domestic Product, rising unemployment, informality, labor market segmentation, the weakening of unions, a crisis of egalitarian democracy, an increase in populism, and political instability (Guillén *et al.*, 2016; López-Roldán and Fachelli, 2021).

This text has been divided into four sections: theoretical approach and analysis

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model, descriptive results, classification of wellness and employment models and conclusions.

THEORETICAL APPROACH AND ANALYSIS MODEL


Using the following analysis model, we typify country clusters, providing a classification based on similarities and dissimilarities. This idea of a social model was inspired by the seminal works of Polanyi (1989), which explains the interrelationship between social institutions and market economies. The institutionalist perspective counters the paradigm of liberal economics and the supposed dominance of market logic. In short, Polanyi reminds us that “as a rule, the human economy is immersed in human relations” (1989).

Our analytical model distinguishes between pre-distributive institutions (labor market) and post-distributive institutions

(welfare regime), which have a long tradition in the history of the labor and trade union movements of Europe and Latin America (see Figure 1). In Europe, the institutionalization of labor and welfare law has been taking place since the 1950s and 1960s (Piketty, 2019), hand in hand with social democracy and Christian democracy (the Keynesian-Fordist pact). In Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, a process of industrialization and development of corporatist social protection was initiated (Martínez-Franzoni, 2007; Cruz Martínez, *et al.*, 2024).

1. *Pre-distributive institutions.* Throughout the history of pre-distributive institutions, the employment contract has played a fundamental role in the 20th century. The contractual formalization of employment has been the core of labor law. This has been a major advance, in addition to the rights to trade unions, participation, information, consultation and collective bargaining. In addition to the

FIGURE 1. *Analysis model*



Source: Author's own creation.

historic achievements accomplished through the formalization of the inter-professional minimum wage, the advancement of three rights, linked to pre-distributive institutions, has been embodied through significant milestones such as the Versailles Treaty (1919), the creation of the ILO and the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), etc. These significant advances were made following the Second World War and have helped to mitigate inequalities in pre-distributive income and reduce wage dispersion (Piketty, 2019). In terms of Industrial Democracy, however, the most notable advances have been made in some of the countries having co-determination and co-management company rights. This is the case with the Scandinavian countries, Germany and Austria, etc. (Sanz *et al.*, 2020; Eurofound, 2024). The expansion of these pre-distributive institutions has been linked to cross-class alliances between unions and socialist and Christian socialist parties in Europe. In Latin America, some labor institutions have developed alongside social movements, as is the case of Peronism in Argentina, Vargasism in Brazil, and Batllism in Uruguay. However, in Latin America, labor and social institutions tend to be very weak (Presbich, 1981; Martínez, 2019).

However, through the institutionalization of labor relations, social conflicts have been channeled and the coordination of wage policies with macroeconomic objectives has been facilitated in Western Europe. In Argentina and Uruguay, some social pacts were made in the 1980s and 1990s (Etchemendy, 2019). In short, the pre-distributive institutions have highlighted the fact that work is a social relationship as opposed to a commercial one (Polanyi, 1989; Piketty, 2019).

2. *Post-distributive institutions.* The origin of post-distributive institutions is linked to social policies, which have been

created in an attempt to correct the inequalities generated by the labor market. This is evident in the history of the construction of the Bismarckian and Beveridgian welfare states in the 1950s and 1960s (Scharpf, 1992; Crouch, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 2000; Piketty, 2019, etc.). Pre-distributive institutions have been and continue to be important but are insufficient to revert primary inequalities (Ruiz-Huertas *et al.*, 2015). Therefore, through industrial democracy, post-distributive rights have been introduced, such as employment insurance, retirement pensions, health, maternity and disability insurance, and transfers of subsidies to families. These social benefits may be considered forms of *deferred wages* in welfare schemes financed by worker contributions (*Bismarckian regimes*) or general taxes (*Beveridgian regimes*). Over recent decades, however, these institutions have eroded. There are diverse causes of this: job insecurity, unemployment, technological change, and the predominance of neoliberal policies.

Towards an employment and welfare model typology

Historically, social institutions have been shaped by the relationships of conflict and pacts with social classes. Today we can identify four major models of employment and welfare regimes, which are as follows:

First, the *liberal employment model* is characterized by its *weak* pre-distributive institutions, with a microeconomic orientation. It involves a company-level wage negotiation system, low collective bargaining coverage rate, weak unions and limited intervention in the economy (Priewe, 2024). This model, found in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, relies on the market and re-

veals major inequalities in economic income. This *Beveridgian*-type welfare system is assistance-based, relies on public and private insurance systems, and is financed through general taxes and individual contributions, respectively (Scharp, 1992; Crouch, 1999).

Second, the *coordinated employment model* is distinguished by its hierarchical system of economic governance, which stands out for its state intervention in the labor market and social protection (Hall and Soskice, 2001). It also relies on social protection systems that contribute to and motivate the increase in productivity. All of this has influenced the stabilization of the economy during the crisis periods (Ruiz-Huertas *et al.*, 2015). Syndicates play a key role in this model, in terms of wage coordination and inflation control. The model, used in Scandinavian and Germanic countries, is characterized by high union membership rates and a tradition of Social Pacts, promoting equitable economic development. In Scandinavian countries, the *Beveridgian*-type welfare system is used, whereas in Social Partnership countries (Austria, Germany, Belgium, Slovenia, etc.) the *corporatist-Bismarckian* type is implemented. Ideologically, it was initially influenced in large part by the social doctrine of the Church and is currently based on proportional contributions of active workers (Crouch, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 2000).

Third, we can consider the existence of a *mixed model, with coordinated employment, but with segmented labor markets*. The distinguishing feature of these economies is their precarious employment, with a certain volume of informal economy and low wages. It is found in southern European countries such as France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Macroeconomic governance is based on a system of governance that is specific to the economy, as coordinated through social

consultation. It relies on a *corporatist-Bismarckian*-type welfare regime, although it includes the participation of families and the support of religious institutions that participate in welfare policy (Ferrera, 1996; Meardi and Tassinari, 2022).

And fourth, we can consider the *heterogeneous employment model*. In Latin America, capitalism is characterized by a “structural heterogeneity” (Prebisch, 1981; Marqués and Chávez 2019; Cruz-Martínez *et al.*, 2024), which implies a structural imbalance with large sectorial differences in productivity. It is a combination of formal and informal economies, distrust of institutions, dual labor markets, local markets, and vestiges of pre-capitalist economies. This generates a large pre-distributive inequality, low levels of productivity, low wages, income concentration, external economic dependence and technological delays.

The governance of this model is complex. *The political elite have an extractive imprint*, which hinders the culture of the social pact (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Etchemendy, 2019). This is a legacy of the colonial past, although since the 1940s, some countries have managed to form a certain corporatist culture. Today, the result is a segmented or even dualized welfare regime (Martínez-Franzoni, 2007; Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016).

Operationalization of variables

In this analysis model, we consider eighteen variables (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2010; López-Roldán and Fachelli, 2015). The data correspond to 35 countries. The analysis model is organized in four interacting dimensions. In Table 1, the following dimensions are shown: employment model, welfare regimes, inequalities and context. Below, we present a description

TABLE 1. *Dimensions and indicators: Active Dimensions: Employment model; Welfare and Inequalities. Illustrative dimensions: Context*

Dimension	Indicator type	Indicator	Justification	Source
Pre-distributive dimension: Employment model	Normative (2023)	Level of salary coordination (1=company and 5=central)	The centralized or decentralized level of wage setting affects equality	(OECD 2023a)
	Normative (2023)	Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate	Workers protected by collective bargaining agreements. Effectiveness of protection	(OECD 2023b)
	Representation (2023)	Union membership rate	Workers' association. Organized power, a counterbalance to corporate power	(OECD 2023c)
	Normative	Public employment rate	Protected employment	OECD (2023d)
	Anti-normative (2023)	Informal occupation rate	Lack of employment contract and legal employment coverage. Non-contributory	OECD (2023d)
	Normative (2023)	Occupation rate	Active workers in the market	World Bank (2023a)
	Normative (2023)	Unemployment rate	Uncertainty, vulnerability	OECD (2023b)
	Normative	Gross wages	Inequalities between countries	World Bank (2023a)
Post-distributive Dimension II: Welfare Regime	Redistributive institutional (2023)	Index Institutions equal distribution	Institutional level of Education, Health, Pensions, Housing, etc.	V-Dem (2023a)
	Ideological cultural (2023)	Individualism versus collectivism	Attitudes towards solidarity redistribution	V-Dem (2023a)
	Normative	Tax rate	Contribution	Our World in data
	Redistributive institutional (2023)	Population protected by social security	Degree of effectiveness of social institutions	
	Institutional 2023	Social Spending Rate	Redistribution	OECD, Our World in data
Dimension III: Inequalities	Income inequality (2008-2023) Post inequality	Pre Gini index Post Gini Index	Inequalities	OECD
Dimension IV	Political (2008-2023)	Political stability	Political instability 2008-2022. Institutional crisis of governance	World Bank (2023b)
	Political	Democracy assessment	Public opinion	Our World in data, V-Dem 2024
	Contextual (2008-2023)	Gross Domestic Product per capita	Estimated level of wealth, recession and growth	OECD (2023f)

Source: Author's own creation with cited data.

of the institutional variables (normative) used for factorial analysis, classification and regression (see in the Appendix Tables 1A, 2A and 3A).

TRENDS IN WELFARE REGIMES AND INEQUALITIES

Trend in welfare regimes and inequalities

Welfare regimes are in decline, according to V-Dem data (2023) which provides the Index of Redistributive Institutions (includes housing, education, health, pensions and subsidies). In the set of 35 countries studied, this index fell by 5.7 % in 2023, as compared to 2008 (using a base index of 100). The largest decline appears to have taken place in housing provision, but it also occurred in other areas. This may be a consequence of the austerity policies implemented during the Great Recession.


The Figure 2 reveals that primary inequalities are very high and tended to increase slightly after the two major crises.

This growth in pre-distributive inequalities correlates with unemployment, the loss of wage purchasing power, and the trend toward reduced collective bargaining coverage. In contrast, post-distributive inequalities have decreased very slightly over the same period. Latin American countries, which enjoyed a period of economic growth between 2008 and 2015, have contributed in large part to this reduction. The financial crisis affected them to a lesser degree or for a much shorter period than European countries.

In Table 2, it is shown that the primary inequalities, measured by the pre-distributive Gini index, rise above the average (0.50) in all of the Latin American countries, characterized by a very high occupational informality. This consequently weakens the tax base and hinders income distribution, as previously demonstrated during the “lost decades” of the 1970s and 1980s (Etchemendy, 2019).

In contrast, the Scandinavian social democratic and social partnership countries also display high primary inequali-

FIGURE 2. *Gini Index pre- and post-distributive, 2008-2023 (Coefficients)*



Source: Author's own creation with data cited from the 35 countries under study.

ties, but they remain well below the average. This may be explained by the virtue of their formal employment and tripartite governance model. However, factors such as labor laws, informal employment, the decline in union power and the decentralization of collective bargaining have contributed to increasing inequalities. Therefore, the current introduction of the minimum interprofessional wage by decree-law in countries such as the United Kingdom (1999) and Germany (2015) is highly relevant. This has been a political response made in an attempt to reduce inequalities. The debate over the minimum wage and the idea of a “living minimum” is a relevant aspect of the debate in order to avoid falling below the poverty line (Piketty, 2019).

Between 2008 and 2023, primary inequalities increased in countries such as Denmark, Ireland, the US, Italy, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Costa Rica. This indicates a deterioration of employment and wages.

Regarding post-distributional inequalities, Latin American countries are found to be above average in this respect. Mediterranean countries also appear slightly above the average for these inequalities. During the aforementioned period, post-distributive inequalities increased in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Bulgaria, among others, indicating a decline in income redistribution. However, efforts were made to correct post-distributive inequalities in Scandinavia and Germany and serve as a benchmark for egalitarian ideologies. In 2023, the countries achieving the greatest percentage of correction in relative post-distributive inequalities (compared to 2008 = base 100) were Denmark and Estonia (44 %), Mexico (43 %), Slovenia (43 %), and the Netherlands (43 %). The countries that were the least successful in reducing inequalities were Argentina (18 %), Brazil, and Norway.


Figure 3 shows the trend for post-distributive inequalities to increase as occupational informality increases. Latin American countries remain very much above the average, having extremely high rates of informal employment, and therefore, very high rates of inequalities. On the contrary, countries with low informal employment rates (Scandinavian and central European) tend to have low levels of inequalities in their post-distributive income. Occupational informality is a burden for distributive institutions for several reasons: i) a lack of employment contracts hinders access to labor and social rights; however, ii) it serves as a fast track to job insertion for the unemployed and immigrants; iii) it facilitates access to immediate income; iv) informality also provides an opportunity for low-cap entrepreneurship; v) it tends to spread in countries with low confidence in political institutions and vi) it serves as a means to evade taxes and labor regulations. Informality can even be a means of complementarity with the formal economy, facilitating cost reduction (ELA, 2023).

In summary, post-distributive inequality correlates positively and significantly with informality ($r = 0.701$) and unemployment rate (0.392). Conversely, inequality decreases as the tax rate increases (-0.666), the population is covered by at least social security insurance (-0.693), and collective bargaining coverage increases (-0.498). Regarding contextual variables, inequality correlates with political instability (-0.563) and a decline of democracy, according to public opinion (-0.500), which affects long-term redistributive legitimacy. Likewise, the level of per capita income has a strong and significant negative correlation ($r = -0.608$) with post-distributive inequalities.

TABLE 2. *Pre-distributive and post-distributive income 2008 to 2023*

	Country	Primary Gini 2008	Primary Gini 2023	Primary Gini variations. 2008=base 100 (%)	Post Gini 2008	Post Gini 2008	Post Gini variations 2008-2023 (5)	Annual Correction Pre and post Gini 2023 (%)
1. Latin America	Argentina	0.59	0.56	-5	0.45	0.46	2	18
	Bolivia	0.65	0.65	0	0.51	0.41	-20	37
	Brazil	0.68	0.68	0	0.51	0.52	1	24
	Chile	0.74	0.71	-4	0.47	0.43	-9	40
	Costa Rica	0.66	0.72	9	0.49	0.47	-5	35
	Mexico	0.76	0.75	-2	0.51	0.43	-16	43
	Uruguay	0.62	0.58	-7	0.45	0.41	-9	30
2. Partnership	Austria	0.46	0.44	-4	0.3	0.31	3	30
	Belgium	0.43	0.41	-5	0.28	0.27	-4	35
	Germany	0.48	0.46	-4	0.31	0.32	3	31
	Netherlands	0.41	0.45	9	0.29	0.26	-11	43
	Slovenia	0.38	0.42	11	0.24	0.24	0	43
3. S.D.	Denmark	0.4	0.5	25	0.25	0.28	12	44
	Finland	0.43	0.41	-5	0.28	0.28	0	32
	Sweden	0.41	0.44	7	0.28	0.3	7	32
	Norway	0.42	0.33	-22	0.27	0.28	3	16
Eastern European	Bulgaria	0.47	0.55	17	0.34	0.39	14	30
	Czech Republic	0.38	0.41	7	0.26	0.26	0	37
	Estonia	0.5	0.5	0	0.32	0.32	0	44
	Croatia	0.46	0.46	0	0.33	0.29	-13	37
	Latvia	0.52	0.48	-8	0.36	0.34	-6	30
	Lithuania	0.5	0.62	24	0.36	0.37	2	41
	Poland	0.5	0.47	-6	0.33	0.28	-16	41
	Romania	0.56	0.5	-21	0.36	0.34	-5	32
	Slovakia	0.39	0.37	-6	0.26	0.24	-8	36
Liberal	Ireland	0.46	0.52	13	0.32	0.3	-7	43
	United Kingdom	0.48	0.46	-5	0.35	0.32	-9	32
	United States	0.56	0.63	12	0.41	0.4	-3	37
	Canada	0.51	0.5	-2	0.34	0.32	-6	36
Southern European	France	0.45	0.46	2	0.33	0.32	-4	31
	Spain	0.45	0.46	2	0.34	0.34	0	36
	Italy	0.48	0.53	10	0.34	0.35	2	34
	Portugal	0.49	0.47	-4	0.37	0.35	-6	26
	Greece	0.46	0.46	0	0.34	0.33	-3	29
	Average	0.5	0.51	2	0.35	0.34	-3	34.2

Source: Author's own creation with cited data. The data for Latin America refers to the urban Gini index.

FIGURE 3. Occupational informality and inequality in economic income

Source: Author's own creation with cited data. Data on informal employment in Europe and Latin America come from OECD employment estimates (2023d). Informal occupation. Outlook, available at: <https://data.oecd.org/>, see also OECD (2019) and ELA (2023).

SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE MODELS


The following cluster analysis provides an additional view of the similarities, dissimilarities, closeness, and distance between countries and their redistribution models to construct a typology. Based on Ward's hierarchical method, the classification reveals four clusters (see Figure 4).

Liberal and transitional regimes

This group includes fifteen countries, although two subgroups may be distin-

guished. The first is made up of liberal countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Slovenia), and the second is made up of Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania), considered to be in "post-communist transition", which have now adopted institutional patterns having some similarities to liberal countries (see Tables 1A, 2A, and 3A in the Appendix).

1) Liberal employment model: Liberal Anglo-Saxon countries are characterized by a low level of microeconomic wage coordination (at the company level). Therefore, they have a low rate of collec-

FIGURE 4. *Dendrogram*

Source: Author's own creation with cited data. KMO test (Active Dimensions I, II and III).

tive bargaining coverage and low union membership. The collective power of the working and middle classes is weak. Fur-

thermore, they have low public employment levels. Salaries are medium-high (\$52,785). In the United States, they are

TABLE 3. *Relative changes in 2023 as compared to 2008 in the liberal countries (relative changes in %)*

	Distribution	Ideal	Gini	CPI	Stability	Opinion of democracy	Taxation	NC Coverage
United States	-7 %	-20 %	-3 %	26.2 %	-73.0 %	-29 %	2 %	-20 %
Canada	-5 %	-26 %	-2 %	21.0 %	-6.0 %	-15 %	5 %	0 %
United Kingdom	-6 %	1 %	2.9 %	9.4 %	2.0 %	-22 %	2 %	-21 %
Ireland	-1 %	-6 %	-5 %	10.1 %	-26.0 %	14 %	-5 %	-20 %
Netherlands	-5 %	-5 %	-11 %	13.8 %	-16.0 %	-13 %	10 %	-8 %

Source: Author's own creation with cited data. 2008=Base 100.

very high, at \$60,000, as also occurs in the United Kingdom, at \$53,000. Overall, these countries have high labor participation rates and low levels of informal employment. Traditionally, they prioritize pre-distributive policies through the labor market, based on the belief that “a rising tide lifts all boats” (Piketty, 2019: 44).

2) Anglo-Saxon liberal welfare regimes: Redistribution institutions have a medium-high rating, with a tradition of welfare policies in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Canada (*Beveridgian* type). Social security coverage is also medium-high, although the ideal of egalitarian democracy is average. Tax burden is below average, in line with current neoliberal discourse. However, between 2008 and 2023, they tended to increase taxes (2 %) in response to the financial and COVID crises (see Table 3). The percentage of the population living under the poverty level is low (13 %). These countries tend to have high *individualist*² values, tolerating some degree of inequality (Piketty, 2019). It should be noted that the US (a

reference country for the neoliberal paradigm) displays high pre- and post-distributive inequalities: it is below average in spending, taxation, social insurance coverage, and the index of redistributive institutions (see tables in the Appendix). This contrasts with the high level of per capita wealth (64,765 dollars).

3) Trends in liberal regimes from 2008 to 2023: Redistributive institutions have regressed in all of these countries. The ideal of egalitarian democracy has declined markedly in the United States, with income inequality increasing despite rising per capita income levels. The political stability has declined considerably in this country, especially following the assault on Congress. The public's assessment of democracy has also declined (-29 %) and the index of redistributive institutions has also decreased (-7 %).

Regarding the Eastern European countries, they have adopted institutions that having similarities to those of the liberal type, such as the microeconomic orientation and the decentralization of collective bargaining. It is a heterogeneous conglomerate with high levels of informal employment and poverty in some of the countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia. The primary inequality is quite high, and the average gross wage is quite low (15,528 dollars), at half of the

2 The US, receiving 91 points in the ranking of individualism, comes in first place. It is followed, with respect to individualistic values, by the United Kingdom (89 points); Netherlands (80); Hungary (80) and Ireland (70). See the World Population Rank 2014. Available at: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/individualistic-countries>

overall average. The per capita GDP is equally low (32,916) as is its recent democratic culture (see tables from Appendix).

Social democratic regimes and social paternariat

The second cluster, situated considerably further away, includes countries of a social democratic tradition (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland) and the so-called Social Paternariat (Partnership). These countries include Germany, Austria and Belgium.

- 1) Employment model: These are neo-corporatist societies having high collective bargaining coverage, high union membership rates and centralized wage coordination. They constitute the ideal type of coordinated economy. Gross salaries are quite high (57,971 dollars). They have high work participation rates and low informal employment, creating a virtuous circle: contractual formality, formal institutions, high tax collection, income redistribution, political stability, notable public employment and unions with significant resources of power and institutional participation.
- 2) Welfare regimes: These are *Beveridgian* (Scandinavian) and *Bismarckian* (Germanic) redistributive institutions having the highest valuation indices. They are ideal egalitarian societies and are considered references in this regard (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Etchemendy, 2019). The population living below the poverty line in these regimes is quite small (13 %). Social coverage and political stability are high. However, political instability has increased between 2008 and 2022. Low primary inequality is due to workers' participation in companies (co-management), and low redistributive inequality is caused by high social spending and high per capita income.
- 3) Trends: These countries enjoy high political stability; public opinion also holds democracy in high regard. However, since 2008, there has been a decline in the appreciation of redistributive institutions in almost all of the aforementioned countries. The ideal social democratic reference type is receding. However, Austria has recorded a slight reduction in income inequality. Tax rates have tended to increase in response to the rising inequalities (except in Sweden). Per capita income has increased significantly in Denmark and Sweden, and moderately in other countries. Collective bargaining coverage has decreased, indicating a decline in union power. Furthermore, for economic reasons (and the potential

TABLE 4. Main relative changes between 2008 and 2023. Variation % (2008= base 100)

	Redistribution	Ideal	Gini	CPI	Stability	Democratic value	Taxation	NC Coverage
Germany	1 %	-6 %	3	13.4 %	-35.0 %	-8 %	5 %	-12 %
Denmark	-3 %	-1 %	9	23.2 %	-19.0 %	0 %	4 %	-2 %
Norway	-15 %	0 %	3	3.0 %	-34.0 %	14 %	1 %	-7 %
Austria	-4 %	-8 %	-2	3.0 %	-53.0 %	-16 %	3 %	-7 %
Finland	-2 %	-5 %	3	13.6 %	-39.0 %	7 %	4 %	1.0 %
Sweden	-3 %	-7 %	1	22.7 %	-22.0 %	6 %	-3 %	-2 %

Source: Author's own creation with cited data.

threat of war), political instability has increased. The appreciation of democracy has declined in Germany and Austria, where the far right is gaining significant ground (see Table 4).

State pay-as-you-go regime in Southern Europe

This conglomerate includes France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Croatia, making up the so-called Mediterranean model. It is a *mixed model, having coordinated employment, but segmented labor markets*, with precarious jobs, a relevant volume of informal economy and low wages. However, these countries have governance systems that are typical of coordinated economies through social consultation and collective bargaining. They rely on a *corporatist-Bismarckian* welfare system that is “family-based”: includes the participation of families and support from the Third Sector, such as religious institutions in the provision of assistance (Ferrera, 1996; Meardi and Tassinari 2022).

1) Employment model: Despite the decentralization policy, the collective bargaining structure has remained high. Union membership is low, with a broad coverage rate of collective agreements thanks to labor legislation, including clauses (*erga omnes*) for co-

llective agreement extension. Only in Portugal has collective bargaining coverage declined. Gross wages tend to be rather low (30,648), although in France they are higher (43,000 dollars). The work force participation rate is low, and unemployment is high. These countries have high primary inequalities.

- 2) Welfare regimes: Egalitarian institutions are above average, with high social coverage and a respectable ideal of egalitarian democracy. The population below the poverty line is relatively low (18 %). Political stability is average, and per capita income is medium-low, having declined since 2008 due to public debt and harsh austerity policies.
- 3) Trends: Distribution institutions (housing, education, healthcare, pensions, and benefits) have regressed compared to 2008, especially in France and Spain (see Table 5). Housing has become significantly more expensive. The ideal of egalitarian democracy has also diminished. Inequality has increased in Spain and Italy, correlating with the decline in per capita income. Overall, the political instability has increased (especially in France). The decline in the appreciation of democracy undermines the legitimacy of redistributive policies.

TABLE 5. *Relative changes in 2023, with respect to 2008 (base 100) (in %)*

	Distribution	Democratic ideal	Post Gini	CPI	Stability	Democratic opinion	NC Coverage Rate
Portugal	-8 %	-11 %	-5	10.50 %	-14 %	-9 %	-23 %
Spain	-4 %	-11 %	1	-2.40 %	29 %	-15 %	0 %
France	-10 %	-5 %	-7	9.70 %	-39 %	-9 %	0 %
Italy	2 %	-1 %	4	6.8 %	-25 %	-8 %	0 %

Source: Author’s own creation with cited data: 2008= base 100.

Dual employment and welfare regimes

This conglomerate is made up of the dual regimes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Although differences exist with respect to the degree of institutionalization, they share the problem of occupational informality. These countries continue to have an extractive economic elite, which is a legacy of colonial political culture (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Furthermore, they display a heterogeneous economic structure, with a significant, export-oriented agricultural sector.

1) Employment model: Latin American countries have formed dual and fragmented societies. The interclass social pact is almost nonexistent, with low coverage of collective bargaining and social protection. Wages are very low (\$7,886 on average), with Bolivia running even farther behind (\$4,332). The informal employment rate is high, reflecting distrust in the political system³. This has generated a negative circle: contractual irregularities, difficulties in accessing social rights, weakness in social coverage and obstacles to collective representation. This fuels political instability and the risk of corruption. The union membership rate is low and has been declining since 2008 (-33 %). The participation rate is below average, although it has increased slightly (+1 %), while the unemployment rate is slightly above average. In this region, the countries having the highest levels of institutionalization are Uruguay and Argentina, which have followed the Bismarckian-corporatist tradition since the 1940s.

2) Welfare regimes: Redistributive institutions are weak and currently have below average ratings. Other features include low per capita income and high levels of primary and post-distributive inequality. Twenty-seven percent of the population lives below the poverty line. In Argentina and Bolivia, this figure reached 39 % in 2023 (World Bank, 2023b). Tax rates are very low throughout the region, especially in Mexico. These countries may be classified as dual regimes given the sharp division between those who are protected by stable employment and those without protection, given that they work in the informal economy (Marqués and Chávez, 2019).

3) Trends: Of the 35 countries studied, this region has the lowest indices of political stability and democratic culture. Between 2008 and 2023, the assessment of welfare regimes decreased (-15 %). In Brazil, the decline was significant (-8 %), whereas in Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, only slight improvements are seen (see Table 6). Democracy has declined alarmingly according to public opinion in Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil. Chile is the only country where opinion on democracy has improved.

On the other hand, informality has decreased in Argentina and Brazil (OECD, 2019). Mexico has reduced inequality thanks to the increase in the minimum wage taking place during the Morena administration over the last six years⁴. Insurance and social benefit coverage is low throughout Latin America. In Argentina, the financial crisis of union social welfare organizations (a legacy of Peronist corporatism) currently threatens health cover-

³ The Latin American barometer suggests distrust in institutions and the political system. See the November 2021 report, available at: <https://www.minsait.com/ideasfordemocracy/es/informe-2021-latinobarometro>

⁴ Suárez, Karina: "Una bandera de la lucha social en México" (*A flag of social struggle in Mexico*). *El País*, 9/3/2025.

TABLE 6. *Changes in distributive institutions and employment institutions (2008-2023) (in %). Base 2008=100*

	Redistribution	Ideal Egalitarian Democracy	Post Gini	CPI	Stability	Social Security	Opinion of democracy	Taxation rate
Argentina	4 %	2 %	-5.6	-7.00 %	10 %	-13	-44 %	5 %
Chile	2 %	-7 %	-2	23.00 %	-73 %	20	-10 %	10 %
Bolivia	1 %	-18 %	-19	29 %	4 %	48	-67 %	-19 %
Brazil	-8 %	-47 %	-4	4.00 %	-6 %	-3	-22 %	-3 %
Uruguay	-5 %	-29 %	-11.2	32.00 %	29 %	0	9 %	20 %

Source: Author’s own creation with cited data.

age. Tax rates have increased significantly in Uruguay and to a lesser extent in other countries. However, they have been reduced in Brazil and Bolivia.

In Latin America, welfare policies are generally used in the absence of stable social security systems (Chávez and Molina 2008; Cruz Martínez *et al.*, 2024). In this region, cynicism with democracy is correlated with informality, political instability, and autocracy, as corroborated by various researchers (Martínez-Fronzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016; Bohigues, 2021; V-Dem, 2023).

Summary of the classification

The following principal components analysis allows us to reduce the complexity of the active variables (mentioned in Table 1) into three components that explain the greatest variability of the data (72 %). The KMO test (0.742) reveals a high correlation between the variables selected in the model, indicating its suitability for the object of study.

1) The first dimension is formed by the horizontal axis. It is defined by the importance of the social institutionality versus labor informality and explains 48 % of the variance. It correlates positively with taxation, redistributive

institutions and negatively with informal employment (see Table 8).

- 2) The second dimension is characterized by high unemployment rates versus work participation rates, explaining 14 % of the variance. It correlates positively with the unemployment rate and negatively with the work force participation rate.
- 3) The third dimension, characterized by wage coordination and collective bargaining coverage, explains 10 % of the variance. This dimension correlates with the union membership rate, the collective bargaining coverage rate, and the level of wage coordination. In other words, it correlates with union

TABLE 7. *Squared Euclidean distance matrix (reference Spain)*

Spain	0.000
Italy	0.539
Portugal	1.593
Uruguay	2.094
Argentina	4.378
Costa Rica	4.438
Chile	6.937
Brazil	9.493
Bolivia	16.914
Mexico	18.082

Source: Author’s own creation with 15 active variables.

power resources (Campillo and Sola, 2020).

On the other hand, in the following spatial distribution of the principal components (see Figure 5) the importance of *social-labor institutional* as a variable related to income inequality is evidenced (Martínez, 2019).

First, three subgroups may be distinguished: Mexico and Bolivia have very low social and labor institutional, followed by Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica with low institutional and then Argentina and Uruguay, having medium-low institutional.

Second, the column with medium-high social and labor institutional includes the statist Mediterranean countries and the liberal countries. Finally, the column with high social and labor institutional

includes the social democratic countries and the social partnership.

The work participation and unemployment component reveals that liberal countries have high work participation rates while, on the contrary, Mediterranean countries have low rates.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Stagnation with a tendency towards growing inequalities


We have shown that primary inequalities tend to increase in Europe, which is associated with the decline of Industrial Democracy, as well as the fall in the level of per capita income.

In contrast, in Latin America, some countries have reduced their primary ine-

TABLE 8. *Main components*

	Components		
	1	2	3
Collective bargaining coverage rate	0.748	0.367	0.317
Wage coordination	0.717	0.167	0.482
Trade union affiliation	0.629	0.041	0.584
Tax rate	0.915	0.172	-0.088
Pre Gini	-0.826	0.158	0.329
Post Gini	-0.736	0.391	0.333
Social spending	0.720	0.444	0.146
% Population with insurance	0.712	-0.374	-0.172
Redistributive Equality Institutions	0.795	-0.022	-0.243
Ideal Equal Democracy	0.760	-0.055	0.063
Activity rate	-0.066	-0.755	0.443
Unemployment rate	0.224	0.806	-0.246
Occupational Informality Rate	-0.790	0.212	0.373
Public employment rate	0.570	-0.076	-0.043
Gross salary in dollars	0.733	-0.237	0.290

Source: Author's own creation, with cited data with 15 active variables.

FIGURE 5. *Spatial distribution of components of labor-social institutions and employment activation*

Source: Author's own creation, with cited data.

qualities and their (still very high) post-distributive inequalities. Autocratic regimes are growing in different countries, and in general, the appreciation of democracy is declining (Bohigues, 2021; Peña, 2022; V-Dem, 2023b).

Post-distributive inequalities have stagnated in Europe and have even increased in certain countries. Many years of neoliberal policies have marked a trend that may be described as a *transition from the socialization of protection to the individualization of risk*.

Coordination mechanisms

Regarding institutional coordination mechanisms (between the labor market and social

protection), we can conclude that the degree of wage coordination, the level of collective bargaining, the extension clauses in agreements, and state intervention (taxation) all play a relevant role in defining social models. However, these mechanisms have been eroding, losing their redistributive effectiveness.

Effects of changes after two crises

Regarding the *first objective*, we have demonstrated that countries with liberal market economies have reduced the assessment of their redistributive institutions, more than countries with coordinated economies. Liberal regimes have opted for economic growth placing a greater emphasis on employment activation policies.

Regarding regime changes, we have shown that the distributive institutions of the Nordic regime have regressed slightly toward the ideal of egalitarian democracy. One of the risks for these countries is increased political instability and the decline in union power resources. The decline in distribution institutions has been much more pronounced in Southern European countries, where their ideal of egalitarian democracy has also declined.

In Latin America, Uruguay has the highest level of social and labor institutionalization. In recent years, it has managed to reduce inequality and informality and improve its political stability. Thus far, Argentina has had a medium-low level of social and labor institutionalization. But it is currently entering uncertain territory given the combination of political instability, informality, low taxation, public debt, and alarming inflation. The current ultra-liberal autocratic government is threatening the country's medium-to-low institutional structure.

Differentiating factors between the models

Regarding the *second objective*, it is found that the main principal component is the level of *social-labor institutionalization, which plays a notable role in the shaping of the models*. At some distance from this, we find the *work participation rates versus unemployment* and the *centralized versus decentralized wage coordination*.

It may be concluded that occupational informality represents the "pure market" ideal: a corrosive acid for institutions of redistributive solidarity. This problem is more acute in Latin America and, to a much lesser extent, in Southern Europe. Informality affects taxation and social rights, leading to uncertainty, loss of trust in institutions, political instability, and corruption. Occupational infor-

mality implies social informality. On the contrary, the formality of the employment contract contributes to access to social rights, facilitates tax contributions, provides access to pension systems, access to redistribution, and facilitates other collective benefits such as union representation, collective bargaining, wage coordination, stability, and trust in the political system. Therefore, the legal formality of employment contracts is key to the sustainability of redistributive solidarity systems. The redistribution of wealth and the institutional participation of social stakeholders are essential for political stability and democracy.

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RECEPTION: October 15, 2024

REVIEW: March 6, 2025

ACCEPTANCE: May 5, 2025

APPENDIX

TABLE 1A. *Employment model*

		Wage coord.	Union affiliation	NC coverage	Unemployment	T-Activ.	Public Emp.	Informal	Pre Gini	Gross Salary
1. Liberal and post-communist transition	Canada	1.00	27.20	31.00	5.40	62.00	19.87	3.50	0.50	42718
	United Kingdom	1.00	23.30	27.00	4.10	60.00	15.98	9.50	0.46	53599
	United States	1.00	10.30	12.00	3.60	59.00	14.91	7.30	0.63	60220
	Ireland	3.00	26.20	34.00	3.60	62.00	14.91	11.10	0.52	53324
	Netherlands	4.00	16.50	76.00	3.60	63.00	11.71	12.80	0.45	62642
	Slovenia	3.00	23.80	79.00	3.60	57.00	16.74	13.00	0.42	23329
	Total	2.17	21.22	43.17	3.98	60.50	15.69	9.53	0.50	49305
	Bulgaria	2.00	15.30	28.00	4.30	54.00	21.10	23.80	0.55	10724
	Czech Republic	2.00	11.40	35.00	2.60	59.00	16.57	9.60	0.41	17331
	Hungary	1.00	9.20	22.00	4.10	58.00	18.86	20.10	0.44	16272
	Slovakia	3.00	16.70	24.00	5.80	58.00	19.00	14.50	0.37	15077
	Estonia	1.00	4.50	19.00	6.30	62.00	22.70	16.40	0.50	19002
	Latvia	1.00	11.60	27.00	6.50	57.00	19.61	14.90	0.48	14749
	Lithuania	1.00	10.00	27.00	7.00	58.00	21.92	26.00	0.62	18761
	Poland	1.00	13.40	13.00	2.90	57.00	17.25	19.70	0.47	15620
2. Social Democrat and Paternalist	Romania	2.00	21.40	15.00	5.60	49.00	16.00	27.10	0.50	12216
	Total	1.56	12.61	23.33	5.01	56.89	19.22	19.12	0.48	15528
	Germany	4.00	16.60	54.00	5.30	59.00	10.63	8.60	0.46	59513
	Austria	4.00	26.30	98.00	5.20	58.00	16.67	5.30	0.44	55577
	Belgium	5.00	49.10	96.00	5.50	52.00	18.29	14.00	0.41	54506
	Denmark	4.00	67.50	82.00	5.10	61.00	27.61	9.30	0.50	66812
	Finland	5.00	62.90	89.00	7.20	56.00	24.24	9.90	0.41	52220
	Norway	4.00	50.00	69.00	3.60	63.00	32.20	15.80	0.33	66603
	Sweden	4.00	65.50	88.00	7.60	61.00	28.66	7.50	0.44	50570
	Total	4.29	48.27	82.29	5.64	58.57	22.61	10.06	0.43	57972
3. Southern Europe	Croatia	1.00	26.50	53.00	6.10	49.00	29.80	13.50	0.46	17714
	Spain	3.00	13.00	80.00	12.10	50.00	15.58	16.50	0.46	30764
	France	2.00	10.80	98.00	7.30	52.00	21.23	13.60	0.46	43618
	Italy	3.00	32.60	100.00	7.60	45.00	13.21	20.40	0.53	34532
	Greece	2.00	10.00	14.00	11.00	45.00	16.65	18.80	0.46	24145
	Portugal	2.00	15.40	77.00	6.50	55.00	14.07	12.00	0.47	22247
	Total	2.37	23.39	48.26	5.55	56.83	17.86	21.20	0.51	30648
4. AL: Heterogeneous dual regimes	Argentina	3.00	27.70	49.00	6.20	56.00	17.80	49.00	0.56	8316
	Brazil	3.00	12.70	70.00	8.00	58.00	12.10	38.90	0.68	5373
	Chile	1.00	16.60	20.00	5.20	55.00	9.40	47.50	0.71	12917
	Costa Rica	1.00	20.50	10.00	5.40	55.00	12.40	57.30	0.72	12917
	Mexico	1.00	12.00	10.00	2.80	59.00	12.50	49.00	0.75	6105
	Uruguay	3.00	30.10	60.00	4.50	58.00	15.70	22.10	0.58	5244
	Bolivia	1.00	12.00	3.00	3.10	67.00	9.40	83.70	0.65	4332
	Total	0.14	18.71	31.71	5.00	58.29	12.76	49.64	0.66	7886
Overall total		2.37	23.39	48.26	5.55	56.83	17.86	21.20	0.51	30648

Source: Author's own creation, with cited data.

TABLE 2A. *Welfare regimes*

		Post Gini	Poverty line	Social spending	Tax rate	% Pop. prot.	Equal resources
1. Liberal and in transition	Canada	0,32	9,40	18,57	33,00	99,80	0,89
	United Kingdom	0,32	18,60	19,29	34,30	93,50	0,84
	United States	0,40	12,70	18,49	26,80	76,10	0,57
	Ireland	0,30	14,00	12,87	29,10	90,10	0,84
	Netherlands	0,26	14,50	16,32	40,20	97,50	0,90
	Slovenia	0,24	12,70	21,47	37,80	100,00	0,90
	Total	0,31	13,65	17,84	33,53	92,83	0,82
1 bis. Transition	Bulgaria	0,39	20,60	19,50	30,30	88,30	0,74
	Czech Republic	0,26	10,20	19,46	33,90	88,80	0,96
	Hungary	0,29	12,10	17,64	34,10	86,20	0,63
	Slovakia	0,24	12,20	17,45	35,60	92,10	0,83
	Estonia	0,32	22,50	17,91	33,80	98,40	0,95
	Latvia	0,34	22,50	16,52	30,90	96,50	0,81
	Lithuania	0,37	20,00	16,99	32,70	92,70	0,81
	Poland	0,28	11,80	21,19	37,80	84,90	0,84
	Romania	0,34	23,50	13,30	27,10	95,00	0,61
	Total	0,31	17,27	17,77	32,91	91,43	0,80
2. Social Democrat and Social Partnership	Germany	0,32	14,80	25,59	40,90	99,50	0,95
	Austria	0,31	14,80	27,71	43,70	98,60	0,89
	Belgium	0,27	12,30	28,22	44,90	100,00	0,95
	Denmark	0,28	12,40	28,44	48,00	89,50	0,98
	Finland	0,28	12,20	29,42	43,20	100,00	0,81
	Norway	0,28	12,90	25,28	41,60	95,80	0,98
	Sweden	0,30	16,10	25,07	43,00	100,00	0,90
	Total	0,29	13,64	27,10	43,61	97,63	0,92
3. Southern Europe	Croatia	0,29	18,00	24,00	35,30	56,00	0,85
	Spain	0,34	20,20	24,65	38,90	80,90	0,89
	France	0,32	15,60	30,74	47,30	100,00	0,80
	Italy	0,35	20,10	27,73	43,30	82,00	0,91
	Greece	0,33	18,80	25,08	39,20	64,00	0,92
	Portugal	0,35	16,40	22,34	37,40	90,20	0,85
	Total	0,33	18,80	25,08	39,20	64,00	0,05
4. LA	Argentina	0,46	39,20	22,34	29,10	58,40	0,74
	Brazil	0,52	27,50	21,37	32,60	69,90	0,51
	Chile	0,43	10,80	11,71	20,80	70,20	0,61
	Costa Rica	0,47	25,50	11,88	14,20	58,00	0,61
	Mexico	0,43	36,30	7,36	13,90	62,40	0,29
	Uruguay	0,41	9,90	20,34	26,80	93,80	0,89
	Bolivia	0,41	39,00	22,20	20,30	46,60	0,38
	Total	0,45	26,89	16,74	22,53	65,61	0,58
Overall total		0,34	18,00	20,81	34,34	85,59	0,80

Source: Author's own creation, with cited data.

TABLE 3A. *Contextual variables*

	Political stability	Democratic culture index	CPI GDP
1. Liberal	Canada	0.77	7.50
	United Kingdom	0.50	6.88
	United States	-0.04	6.25
	Ireland	0.88	10.00
	Netherlands	0.72	8.75
	Slovenia	0.71	6.25
	Total	0.72	7.88
1bis. Liberal transition	Bulgaria	0.25	4.38
	Czech Republic	0.82	7.50
	Hungary	0.84	6.88
	Slovakia	0.44	5.63
	Estonia	0.72	6.88
	Latvia	0.48	6.25
	Lithuania	0.65	5.63
	Poland	0.50	6.25
	Romania	0.49	3.75
	Total	0.58	5.91
2. Social Democrat and Social Partnership	Germany	0.61	8.13
	Austria	0.64	6.88
	Belgium	0.58	6.88
	Denmark	0.87	9.38
	Finland	0.89	9.38
	Norway	0.86	10.00
	Sweden	0.90	10.00
	Total	0.76	8.66
3. Southern Europe	Croatia	0.61	4.38
	Spain	0.27	7.50
	France	0.33	6.88
	Italy	0.41	7.50
	Greece	0.06	7.50
	Portugal	0.86	6.88
	Total	0.42	6.77
4. Dual	Argentina	-0.01	3.75
	Brazil	-0.33	5.00
	Chile	0.12	6.88
	Costa Rica	0.95	6.88
	Mexico	-0.69	1.88
	Uruguay	1.10	6.88
	Bolivia	-0.28	1.25
	Total	0.12	4.65
Overall average		0.50	6.65

Source: Author's own creation, with cited data.