Valor y distribución

De la teoría a la norma

Abstract

An approach to the problem of inequality, or more specifically that of justice, means starting
from a distributive criterion and contrasting the distribution actually existing against this. Locke
proposed a theory or standard of the original application referring to the distribution of natural
resources, but was unable to solve the problem of intergenerational justice. Marx drew up a
value-work theory which was unable to explain why the use of the activity itself as work, rather
than its consumption as leisure, would give the right to appropriation of the surplus, but the
use of wealth as capital rather than its consumption as income, would not. Rawls suggests the
principle of difference as a liberal theory of justice, and in this it is possible to find room for
inequalities on the condition that these improve the situation of the worst placed person. This
article defends the relevance of all three problems which concern, respectively, the appropriation
of natural resources (and, therefore, inherited wealth), the products of labour, and the incentivation
of extraordinary contributions. Also proposed, however, is a correction of all three: in the
case of the first, replacing the original appropriation with initial endowments to make room for
equality between generations; in the second, resorting to a standard of increased work value that
includes compensation for abstinence, that is, from capital; in the third, replacing its blind
acceptance with idea of starting out from the difference, in other words reducing compensation
for extraordinary contributions to the incentive necessary for these.